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IS JAPAN CREATING A YEN BLOC IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC?
ABSTRACT
mc paper reaches seven conclusions regarding the Yen Bloc that Japan is reputed to be
forming in Paci tic Asia. (I) Gravity-model estimates of bilateral trade show that the jgyg) of trade in
East Asia is biased mb's-regionally, as It is within the European Community and within the Western
Hemisphere, to a greater extent than can be explained naturally by distance. One might call these
three regions 'super-natural' blocs, in cootrast to Kmgman's "natural" trade blocs. (2) There ia no
evidence of a special Japan effect. (3) Once one properly accounts for rapid growth in Asia, the
statistics do not bear out a toward mntra-regionat bias of trade flows. (4) The world's strongçst
trade grouping Is the one that includes the U.S. and Canada with the Asian/Pacific countries, i.e,
APEC. (5) There Is a bit more evidence of rising Japanese influence in East Asia's financial markets.
Tokyo appears to have acquired significant influence over interear rates in a few Asian countries,
though overall Its Influence Is as yet no greater than that of New York. (6) Some of Japan's financial
and monetary influence takes place through a growing role for the yen, at the expense of the dollar,
The yen has become relatively more important in exchange rate policies and invoicing of trade and
finance in the regon. (7) Butthistrend is less the outcome of Japanese policy-makers' wishes, than






and NEERIs Japan Creating a Yen BlocinEast Asia and the Pacific?
A debate got underwayin1991 over whether a global trend toward three economic blocs
--theWestern Hemisphere, centered on the United States; Europe, centered on the European
Community; and East Asia, centered on Japan --isgood or bad. Krugman (l991a), Bhagwati
(1990, 1992), and Bergsten (1991), argue that the trend is, on balance, bad. Krugman (1991b)
and Lawrence (199k) argue that it is, on balance, good) Most appear to agree, however, that
a trend toward three blocs is indeed underway.
There is no standardly agreed definition of an "economic bloc. A useful definition
might be a group of countries who are concentrating their tradc and financial relationships with
each other, in preference to the rest of the world. One might wish to add to the definition the
criterion that this concentration is the outcome of government policy, or at least of factors that
are nomeconomic in origin, such as a common language or culture. In two out of the three
parts of the wnrld, there have clearly been recent deliberate political steps toward economic
integration. In Europe, the previously-lethargic European Economic Community has burst forth
with the programs of the Single Market, European Monetary Union, and more. In the Western
Hemisphere, we have the Caribbean Basin Initiative and (more seriously) the Canadian-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement, followed by a prospective North America Free Trade Area and
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.
Those who fear Ihe blocs do so because theythinkthey will tend to he protectionist.. Froot and Yoffie (19Q1)
in this volume pursue this logic, and point out some implications of foreign direct investment. Knigmass (199th)
argues in fsvor of the three blocs on the grounds that they are 'natural,' in a sense explained below. Lawrence's
(t991c) argument in favor of blocs is that they can cement politically pro-liberalization scntment in individual
countries.In East Asia, by contrast, overt preferential trading arrangements or other political moves
to promote regional economic integration are lacking, as has been noted by others.2 The
ASIEAN countries (Association of SouthEast Asian Nations), to be sure, are taking steps in the
direction of turning what used to be a regional security group into a free trade area of sorts.
But when Americans worry, as they are wont to do, about a trading bloc forming in Asia, it is
generally not ASEAN that concerns them. Rather it is the possibility of an East Asia- or
Pacific-wide bloc dominated by Japan.
Japan is in fact unusual among major countries in n having preferential trading
anangements with smaller neighboring countries. But the hypothesis that has been put forward
is that Japan is forming an economic bloc in the same way that it runs its economy: by means
of policies that are implicit, indirect, and invisible. Specifically, the hypothesis is that Japan
operates, by means of such instruments as flows of aid, foreign direct investment, and other
forms of finance, to influence its neighbors' trade toward itself.3 This is a hypothesis that
should not be accepted uncritically, but rather needs to be examined empirically.
After examining some of the relevant statistics, this paper argues that the evidence of an
evolving East Asian trade bloc centered on Japan is not as clear as many believe, Trade
between Japan and other Asian countries increased substantially in the late 1980s, But intro-
regional trade bias did not increase, as it did, for example, within the European Community.
The phrase "Yen Bioc could be interpreted as referring to the financial and monetary aspects
implicit in the words, rather than to trade flows. The second half of the paper does find
2 Petri (t991b).
For on of maty examptes, see Donbusch (t559).
2evidence of growing Japanese influence in the Pacific via financial and monetary channels, rather
than primarily via trade flows. But it does not find evidence that the country has taken
deliberate steps to establish a Yen Bloc.
PART I: IS A TRADE BLOC FORMING IN PACIFIC ASIA?
We must begin by acknowledging the obvious: the greatly increased economic weight of
East Asian countries in the world. The rapid outward-oriented growth of Japan, followed by
the four East Asian NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) and more recently by some of the
other ASEAN countries, is one of the most remarkable and widely-remarked trends in the world
economy over the last three decades. But when one asks whether a yen bloc is forming in East
Asia, one is presumably asking something more than whether the economies are getting larger,
or even whether economic flows among them are increasing. One must ask whether the share
of intra-regional trade is higher, or increasing more rapidly, than would be predicted based on
such factors as the CINP or growth rates of the countries involved.
Adjusting Intra-regional Trade for Growth
Table 1 reports three alternative ways of computing intra-regionat trade bias. The first
part of the table is based on a àimple breakdown of trade (exports plus imports) undertaken by
countries in East Asia into trade with other members of the same regional grouping, versus trade
3with other parts of the world.4 For comparison, the analogous statistics are reported for
Western Europe (the EC Twelve) and for North America (the United States, Canada, and
Mexico). The share of intra-rcgional trade in East Asia increased from 33 per cent in 1980
to 37 per cent in 1989. Pronouncements that a clubbisb trade bloc is forming in the region are
usually based on figures such as these. But the numbers are deceptive.
All three regions show increasing intra-group trade in the 1980s. The region that has
both the highest and the fastest-increasing degree of intra-regional trade is not Asia but the
European Community, reaching 59 per cent in 1989. The share of intra-regional trade in East
Asia has not even been increasing appreciably faster than that in North America.
Quite aside from the comparison with Europe, it is easy to be misled by intra-regional
trade shares such as those reported in the first three rows of Table 1. If one allows for the
phenomenon that most of the East Asian countries in the 1980s experienced rapid growth inlQtaj
output and trade, then it is possihie that there has in fact been no movement toward intra-
regional bias in the evolving pattern of trade. The increase in the intra-regional share of trade
that is observed in Table 1 could be entirely due to the increase in economic size of the
countries. To take the simplest case, imagine that there were no intra-regional bias in 1980, that
each East Asian country conducted trade with other East Asian countries in the same proportion
as the latter's weight in world trade (15 Ye [= 57813842]). Total trade undertaken by Asian
countries increased by 108 per cent in dollar terms over this nine-year period, while total trade
worldwide increased by only 53 per cent. Even if there continued to be no regional bias in
1989, the observed intra-regional share of trade would have increased by one-third (to 20 %
These statistics are presented in more detail in Table I in Frankel, 1991c.
4[= 1200/5892])due solely to the greater weight of Asian countries in the world economy.
Consider now the more realistic case where, due to transportation costs if nothing else,
countries within each of the three groupings undertake trade that is somewhat hiased toward
trading partners within their own group (East Asia, North America, and the European
Community). Although East Asian trade with other parts of the world increased rapidly [by 93
% [751.5/388.5]], trade with other Asian countries increased even more rapidly [by 137 % in
dollar terms [448/189]]. Does this mean that the degree of clubbishness or within-region bias
intensified over this period? No, it does not. Even if there was no increase at all in thebias
toward intra-AsianIrade, the more rapid growth of total trade and output experienced by Asian
countries would show up as a rate of growth of intra-Asian trade that was faster than the rate
of growth of Asian trade with the rest of the world.
Think of each East Asian country in 1980 as conducting trade with other East Asian firms
in the same proportion as their weight in world trade (15 %)multipliedby a regional bias term
to explain the actual share reported in Table 1 (33 96). Then the regional bias term would have
to be 2.18 (=.33/.15). An unchanged regional bias term multiplied by the East Asians' 1989
weight in world trade would predict that the 1989 intra-regional share of trade would be 44 per
cent (2. 18x.20 =.436).The actual intra-regional share, however, did not increase to nearly this
level. Thus the East Asian bias toward within-region trade, far from rising, actually diminished
in the 1980s1 The implicit intra-regional bias fell to 1.9 (=.37/.20), as shown in the middle
rows of Table 1.
5A Test on Bilateral Trade Flows
Theanalysis should be elaboratedbyuse of a systematic framework for measuring what
patternsof bilateral trade are normal around the world; the so-called '1gravity" modeL5 A
dummy variable can then be added to represent when both countries in a given pair belong to
the same regional grouping, and one can check whether the level and time trend in the East
Asia/Pacific grouping exceeds that in other groupings. We do not currently have measures of
historical, political, cultural and linguistic ties. Thus it will be possible to interpret the dummy
variables as reflecting these factors, rather than necessarily as reflecting discriminatory trade
policies. Perhaps we should not regret the merging of these different factors in one term,
because as noted there are in any case no overt preferential trading arrangements on which
theories of a Japanese trading bloc could rely.6
The dependent variable is trade (exports plus imports), in log form, between pairs of
countries in a given year. We have 63 countries in our data set, so that there are 1,953 data
points (=63x62/2) fur a given year2 The goal, again, is to see how much of the high level of
trade within the East Asian region can be explained by simple economic factors common to
bilateral trade throughout the world, and how much is left over to be attributed to a special
See Deardorff (1984, pp.503-04) for a survey of the (short) subject of gravity equations.
Krugman (1991) has made a crude first pass at applying the gravity model to the question whether Europe and
North America are separate trading btoca, but did not get as far as including other countries, or including a variable
for distanre.
There are some miming values (245in1985 for example), normally due to levels of trade too small to be
recorded. In the 1990 results reported here, Taiwan trade ia missing. Detsila on the countries are given in an
Appendix.
6regional effecL.
One would expect the two most important factors in explaining bilateral trade flows to
be the geographical distance between the two countries, and their economic size. These factors
are the essence of the gravity model. A large part of the apparent bias toward inn-regional
trade is certainly due to simple geographical proximity. Indeed Krugman (l99lb) suggests it
may altbedue to proximity so that the three trading blocs are "natural" (as distinct from
"unnatural" trading arrangements between distant trading partners such as the United States and
Israel). Although the importance of distance and transportation costs is clear, there is not a lot
of theoretical guidance on precisely how they should enter. We experiment a bit with functional
forms. We also add a dummy "Adjacent" variable to indicate when two countries share a
common border.
The equation to be estimated is:
1og(T1)=e+11og(GNP1GNP) +I?'2log(GNP/pop1GNP/pop)
+1og(DISTANCE)+(ADJACENT)÷y (EEC1J) +y2 (WH) '13 (ASIA1)
The last four explanatory factors aredummyvariables.
Detailson the data sources, groupings of countries, method for computingdistance.,etc, are available on
request.
7Entering GNPs in product form is empirically well-established in bilateral trade
regressions.it can be easily justified by the modem theory of trade under imperfect
competition.5 In addition there is reason to believe that (INP per capita has a positive effect,
for a given size: as countries become more developed, they tend to specialize more and to trade
more.
The results are reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4. We found all three variables to be highly
significant statistically (> 99% level). The coefficient on the log of distance was about -.56,
whenthe adjacency variable (which is also highly significant statistically) is included at the same
time. This means that when the distance between two non-adjacent countries is higher by 1 per
cent, the trade between them falls by about .56percent,'° We tested for possible non-linearity
in the log-distance term, as it could conceivably be the cause of any apparent bias toward intra-
regional trade that is left after controlling linearly for distance. Quadratic and cubic terms
turned out to be not at all significant. We report here only results without them.
The estimated coefficient on ONP per capita is about .29 as of 1980, indicating that
richer countries do indeed trade more, though this term declines doring the 1980s, reaching .08
in 1990. The estimated coefficient for the log of the product of the two countries' (3NPs is
about .75, indicating that, though trade increases with size, it increases less-than-proportionately
(holding GNP per capita constant). This presumably reflects the widely-known pattern that small
The specification implies that trade between two equal-sized countries (say, of size .5) will he greater than
trade between a large and small countiy (say, of size .9 and .t). This property of models with imperfect
competition is not a property of the classical Heckacher-Ohlin theory of comparative advantage. Helpman (t987)
and Helpman and Krugman (t985, section 1.5). Foundations for the gravity model are ales offered by Anderson
(t979) and other papers surveyed by Deardorff (t984, pp.503-06).
"Thecoefficient on the log of distanre was about .8 when the adjaceiscy variable was not included.
8economies tend to be more open to international trade than larger, more diversified, economies.
If there were nothing to the notion of trading blocs, then these basic variables would soak
up all the explanatory power. There would be nothing left to attribute to a dummy variable
representing whether two trading partners are both located in the same region. In this case the
level and trend in intra-regional trade would be due solely to the proximity of the countries, and
to their rapid rate of overall economic growth. But we found that dummy variables for intra-
regional tradestatisticallysignificant, both in East Asia and elsewhere in the world. If two
countries are both located in the Western Hemisphere for example, they will trade with each by
an estimated 1/2 a per cent more than they would otherwise, even after taking into account
distance and the other gravity variables. Intra-regional trade goes beyond what can be explained
by proximity, what Krugman (l991b) calls a "natural" trading bloc. We might refer to such
intra-regional trade bias as evidence of HsupernatuH trading blocs.
When the boundaries of the Asian bloc are drawn along the lines of those suggested by
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir in his proposed East Asian Economic Caucus, which excludes
Australia and New Zealand (and also China, in the version tested here), the coefficient on the
Asian bloc appears to be the strongest and most significant of any in the world. Even when the
boundaries are drawn in this way, however, there is no evidence of an increase in the intra-
regional bias of Asian trade during the 1980s: the estimated coefficient actually decreases
somewhat from 1980 to 1990. Thus the gravity results corroborate the back-of-the-envelope
calculation reported in the preceding section. The precise pattern is a decrease in the first half
of the decade, followed by a very slight increase in the second half, matching the results of Petri
9(1991a).Lt None of these changes over time is statisticallysignificant.
It is perhaps surprising thai the estimated ygj of the intra-regional trade bias was higher
in East Asia as of 1980 than in the other two regions. One possible explanation is that there has
historically been a sort of 'trading culture" in Asia. To the extent that such a culture exists and
can be identified with a particular nation or ethnic group, I find the overseas Chinese to be a
more plausible factor than the Japanese
Of the three trading blocs, the EEC and the Western Hemisphere are the twothat show
rapid intensification in the course of the 1980s. Both show an approximate doubling of their
estimated intra-regional bias coefficients. As of 1980, trade within theflEC is not strong enough
after holding constant for the close geographical proximity and high incomes per capita of
European countries --forthe bias coefficient of .2 to appear statistically significant. The EEC
coefficient increased rapidly in level and significance in the first half of the l980s, reaching
about .4 in by 1985, and continued to increase a bit in the second half. The effect of two
countries being located in Europe pgj, when tested, does not show up as being nearly as
strong in magnitude or significance as the effect of membership in the EEC.
The Western Hemisphere coefficient experienced all its increase in the second half of the
decade, exceeding .9 by 1990. The rapid increase in the Western Hemisphere intra-regional bias
in the second half of the 19 SOs is in itself an important new finding. The recovery of Latin
American imports from the United States after the compression that followed the 1982 debt crisis
must be part of this phenomenon. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement signed in 1988 may
also be part of the explanation.
"Petri infers, fromthedata on intra-regional tradeshares,a decrease in East Asian interdependence in the early
t9SOs,foEnwed by a reversalin the second halfofthe decade,
10We consider a sequence of nested candidates for trading blocs in the Pacific. The
significance of a given bloc effect turns out to depend on what other blocs are tested at the same
time. One logical way to draw the boundaries is to include all the countries with.eastern coasts
• on the Pacific, as in the statistics considered in the preceding section. We call this grouping
"Asian Pacific" in the tables. Its coefficient and significance level are both higher than the
EAEC dummy.Whenwe broaden the bloc-search wider and test for an effect of APEC
(Association of Pacific Economic Cooperation), which includes the United States and Canada
in with the others, it is highly significant. The significance of the Asian Pacific dummy
completely disappears, and that of the EAEC dummy returns.
APEC appears to be the correct place to draw the boundary. When we test for the
broadest definition of a Pacific bloc, including Latin America, it is not at all significant, and the
other coefficients do not change. (It is called "Pacific Rim" in the tables.) It remains true that
the intra-regional biases in the EEC and Western Hemisphere blocs each roughly doubled from
1980 to 1990, while intra-regional biases in the Asia and Pacific areas did not increase at all.
The only surprising new finding is the APEC effect: the United States and Canada appear to be
full partners in the Pacific bloc, even while simultaneously belonging to the significant but
distinct Western Hemisphere bloc. The APEC coefficient is the strongest of any. Its estimate
holds relatively steady at 1.3 (1980), 1.0 (1985), and 1.2 (1990).12
One possible explanation for the apparent intra-rcgional trade biases within East Asia and
°Othershave reported the high volume of trans-Pacific trade. But it has been difficuh to evaluate such
statistics when no account is taken of these countrieC collective size. A higher percentage of economic activity in
a larger region will consist of intrs-regional than in a smatter region, even when there is no intra-regional bias,
merely because smaller regions tend by their nature to trade across their boundaries more than larger ones. In the
limit, when the unit is the world, 100 per cent of trade is intra-'regional."
11within the APECgrouping is that transportation between Pacific Asian countries is mostly by
water,whiletransportation amongEuropean or WesternHemisphere countriesismore often
overland, and that ocean-shipping is less expensive than shipping by rail or road, This issue
bears further investigation. The issue of water versus land transport should not affectresults
regarding changes in intraregional trade bias in the 1980s, however, given that the nature of
shippingcosts does not appear to have changed over as short a time span as five or ten years.
Several further questions naturallyarise.ASEANnegotiateda preferentialtrading
arrangement within its membership in 1977 (although serious progress in removal of barriers did
not getunderwayuntill987).' In early1992, themembersproclaimed plans foran ASEAN
FreeTrade Area, albeit with exemptions for many sectors. Does this grouping constitute a small
bloc nested within the others? We include in our model a dummy variable for common
membership in ASEAN.t4 It tums out to have a significant coefficientonlyifnoneof the
broader Asian blocs are included. The conclusion seems to be that ASEAN is not in fact
functioningasa trade bloc.
We know that most East Asian countries are very open to trade of all sorts. So we added
a dummy variable to indicate when flgt one of the pair ofcountriesis located in PacificAsia,
to supplement the dummy variable that indicates when both are. Its coefficient is significant,
but still leaves a significant coefficient for the East Asian bloc term.
We also know that Singapore and Hong Kong are especially open countries, and engage
in a certain amount of entrepot trade. Once again, a dummy variable for these two countries'
° Jackson(199t).
'In tests similar to ours, Hamilton and Winters (1991) found the A5HAN dummy to reflect one of the most
significant trading areasiothe world.
12trade with other Asian Pacific countries is highly significant (with a coefficient of .9) when it
is included, but does not otherwise change the results.
We tried a few more extensions as well. We disaggregated trade into manufactured
goods, agricultural products, fuels, and other raw materials. The results changed little. Raw
materials show the greatest Asian bloc effect it' judged by the estimated coefficient.
Manufactures shows the greatest effect if judged by t-statistics. Desirable extensions for the
future, besides further disaggregation, include adding factor endowment terms.
What about bilateral trade between Asian/Pacific countries and Japan in particular? Like
intra-regional trade overall, trade with Japan increased rapidly in the second half of the 1980s.
Most of this increase merely reversed a decline in the first half of the l980s however.'5 More
importantly, the recent trend in bilateral trade between Japan and its neighbors can be readily
explained as the natural outcome of the growth in Japanese trade overall and the growth in trade
levels attained by other Asian countries overall. Lawrence (l991b) has calculated that, out of
the 28 percentage point increase in the market share of Pacific Asian developing countries in
Japanese imports from 1985 to 1988, 11 percentage points is attributable tO improved
competitiveness (as reflected in increased exports from Pacific Asia to worldwide markets), and
18 percentage points is attributable to the commodity mix of these countries' exports. There is
no residual to be attributed to Japan's development of special trading relations with other
countries in its region.'6
We confirmed this finding (though without as yet decomposing trade by commodity) by
"Petrit991a.
"Theempiricat literature on whetherJapanis so outlier in its ttading patterns, particularly with respect to
imports of manufactures, includes saxonl,ouse (1959), Noland (1991) and Lawrence (1991a), among others.
13adding to our gravity model a separate dummy variable for bilateral Asian trade with Japan in
particular. It was not even remotely statistically significant in any year, and indeed the point
estimate was a small negative number. (The results are not reported in this version of the
paper.) Thus there was no evidence that Japan has established or come to dominate a trading
bloc in Asia.17
To summarize the most relevant effects, if two countries both lie within the houndaries
of APEC, they trade with each other a little over 1 per cent more than they otherwise would.
The nested EAEC bloc is less strong, and has declined a bit in magnitude and significance
during the course of the 1980s. The Western Hemisphere and EC blues, hy contrast, intensified
rapidly during the decade. Indeed1 by 1990, the Western Hemisphere bloc was stronger than
the EAEC bloc, if one takes into account the existence -of the APEC effect. There was never
a special Japan effect within Pacific Asia.
In short, beyond the evident facts that countries near each other trade with each other,
and that Japan and other Asian countries are growing rapidly, there is no evidence that Japan
is concentrating its trade with other Asian countries in any special way, nor that they are
collectively moving toward a trade bloc in the way that Western Europe and the Westem
Hemisphere appear to be. -Wenow turn from trade to finance.
°Tosave apace, the results for the Japan dummy are not reported in this version of the paper. Nor are the
results showing the effects of the two dummy variables meant to capture effects of openness of Asian countries in
general and of Hong Kong/Singapore in particular. ITabtas showing these results appeared with the April 1992
conference version of this paper.] - -
14PART IL JAPAN'S FINANCIAL JNFLUENCE IN THE REGION
In the case of financial flows, proximity is less important than it is for trade flows. For
some countries the buying and selling of foreign exchange and highly-rated bonds is
characterized by the absence of significant government capital controls, transactions costs or
information costs. In such cases, there would be no particular reason to expect greater capital
flows among close countries than distant ones. Rather, each country would be viewed as
depositing into the world capital pool, or borrowing from it, whatever quantity of funds it
wished at the going world interest rate. Thus even if we could obtain reliable data on bilateral
capital flows (which we cannot), and whatever pattem they happened to show, such statistics
would not be particularly interesting.
Tokyo's Influence on Reelonal Financial Markets
Many Asian countries still have substantial capital controls, and financial markets that
are in other respects less than fully developed. Even financial markets in Singapore and Hong
Kong, the most open in Asia, retain some minor frictions. Where the links with world capital
markets are obstructed by even small barriers, it is an interesting question to ask whether those
links are stronger with some major financial centers than with others. This question is explored
econometrically below.
Information costs exist for equities, and for bonds with some risk of default. These costs
may be smaller for those investors who are physically, linguistically, and culturally close to the
nation where the borrower resides. Proximity clearly matters as well in the case of direct
15investment, in part because much of direct investment is linked to trade, in part because
linguistic and cultural proximity matter for direct investment.
Forei2n Direct Investment
Table 5 shows the standard Ministry of Finance figures for Japanese direct investment.
The steady stream of direct investment by Japanese firms in East Asia and the Pacific (incloding
Australia) has received much attention. But the table shows that, whether measured in terms
of annual flows or cumulated stocks, Japan's direct investment in the region is approximately
equal to its investment in Europe, and is much less than its investment in North America.€
It has been argued that once one scales the Table 5figuresfor GNP among the host
countries, an Asian bias to Japanese direct investment might indeed appear.'9 But if one scales
the FDI figures by the host region's role in world trade, one finds that Japan's investment in
Asia and Oceania is almost exactly in proportion to their size. There is no regional bias. Its
EDT in the United States and Canada, on the other hand, is more than twice what one would
expect from their share of world trade. Japan's investment in Europe is about half the
continent's share of trade.
Furthermore, Ramstetter (1991a, p.95-96; 1991b, p.8-9) has forcefully pointed out that
the standard Ministry of Finance figures on Japanese foreign direct investment actually represent
statistics on investment either approved by or reported to the government, and greatly overstate
the extent of true Japanese investment in developing countries. The more accurate balance of
see also Koroiya and Wakssugi (1991).
Nigel Holloway, 'Half-full, half empty, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 1991, p-69.
16payments data from the Bank of Japan show a smaller percentage of investment going to Asia.
Tokvct vs. New York Effects on Asian Interest Rates
Statistics also exist on Japanese portfolio investment. But, in the case of portfolio capital,
looking at quantity data is not as informative as looking at price data --thatin, at interest rates.
For one thing, the quality of the data on interest rates is much higher than the quality of the data
on capital flows. For another, the interest rate test is more appropriate conceptually. If the
pqicnlial for arbitrage keeps the interest rate in a given Asian country closely in line with, say,
Tokyo interest rates, then this constitutes good evidence of close links between the two national
capital markets, even if the amount of actual arhitrage or other capital flow that takes place
within a given period happens to be small.
Many East Asian countries have moved to liberalize and internationalize their financial
markets over the last ten to fifteen years!° A number of studies have documented Japan's
removal of capital controls over the period 1979-84 by looking at the power of arbitrage to
equalize interest rates between Tokyo and New York or L.ondon,2'Australia and New
Zealand, while lagging well behind Japan, also show signs of liberalization during the course
of the 1980s!2 Hong Kong and Singapore register impressively open financial markets,
'Frankel(t99ta) presents the 1980s evidence (or Japan,Australia,New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong and
Malaysia. Faruqee (199t) examines interest differentials for Korea, Malayaia, Singapore and ThaLtand (via-a-via
yen interest rates in London), but does not take into account exchange rate expectations.
These include Otani and Tiwari (t981), Ito (1986), and Fran]cel (1984). The interest rates in the calculations
are covered on the forward eschange or Eurocurreney markets so as to avoid exchange risk. [Teats that took at
real or uncovered interest differentiala, rather than covered interest differentials, include Ito (19St) and Fukeo and
Okubaj
The frequently large negative covered differential that had heen observed for Australia up to mid-1983 (see,
e.g., Argy, 1987) largely vanished thereafter,
17showing smallerinterest differentials eventhan some open European countries like Germany.
(Hong Kong has long had open capital markets. Singapore undertook a major liberalization in
1978, though it has tried to segment its domestic money market from its offshnre "Asia dollar
market. 't23)Malaysia has officially liberalized following Singapore,24 though its covered
differential has remained considerably higher.
We can apply a simple test to the hypothesis that a particular Asian country is dominated
financially by Japan, versus the alternative hypothesis that ties to capital markets in the other
industrialized countries are equally strong. We run the following OLS regression to see how
the interest rate in a typical Asian country depends on interest rates in Tokyo and New York.
Under the null hypothesis that the country's financial markets are insufficiently developed or
liberalized to be directly tied to any foreign financial markets, the coefficients on foreign interest
rates should be zero. Under the alternative hypothesis that the country's financial markets are
closely tied to those in Tokyo, the coefficient on Tokyo interest rates should be closer to 1 than
to 0; and similarly for New York.25
Table 6 presents estimates for three-month interest rates in Hong Kong and Singapore.
For the Hong Kong interest rate, the influence of the New York market appears very strong.
See MOreOO (198 8). Fdwards and Khsn (1985)includesanother test of covered interest parity for Singapore.
Abdd;n (1986) and Gtick and Hutchison (1990, p.4S).
° It ahoold be noted that if eapitat markets in Tokyo and New York areclosely tiedto each other, as they
indeed are, then msltteollioearity might make it difficolt to obtain statistically significant estimates. But this does
oot mean that there is anything wrong with the test. A finding that the coefficient 00 the Tokyo interest rate is
statistically greater tItan 0, or than the coefficient on the New York interest rate, remains valid.
18This is not surprising; not only does the Colony have open financial markets, but its currency
has since October 1983 been pegged to the U.S. dollar," so that there is nothing to inhibit
perfect arbitrage between its interest rates and U.S. interest rates. Neither Tokyo, London, nor
Frankfurt, has significant influence in Hong Kong on average over the sample period (from 1976
to 1989). For the Singapore interest rate, the influence of New York is again very significant;
but now there is also a significant, though smaller, weight on Tokyo. The evidence suggests
that both countries have had open financial markets ever since the mid-1970s, with New York
having the dominant influence, but with Tokyo also having a one-quarter effect in the case of
Singapore.
To see whether the influence of the foreign financial centers changed over the course of
the sample period, we can allow for time trends in the coefficients, also reported in Table 6.
For Hong Kong, it is clear that London used to have a strong influence, and equally clear that
the British influence has been diminishing over time. For Singapore, there is no sign of change
in New York's role, but there is weak evidence of a role for Frankfurt that has been gradually
diminishing over time, and of a gradually increasing role for Tokyo.
Similar tests were also run for four other Pacific countries: Australia, New Zealand,
Taiwan and Korea (not reported here, to save space). There is evidence of a I..ondort effect in
Australia that has been slowly increasing during the sample period, and a Frankfurt effect in
New Zealand that gave way to a Tokyo effect late in the sample period. [There also appears
a Frankfurt effect in Taiwan and Korea with little time trend.]
Overall, there is only weak evidence in Table 6 of a special role for Tokyo as a financial
See, e.g.. Batassaawl Wifliamson (t990, p32).
19center exerting influence in its part of the world. But during most of the sample period
examined, most Asian countries had not yet opened their financial markets to external influence
by ggjy foreign center.
The foregoing tests of quarterly data will now be expanded to an analysis of monthly data
for the six Pacific Asian countries, from the mid-1970s to 1990? In each ease, we test for
the influence of all four financial centers: New York, London, Frankfurt, and Tokyo.
When local interest rates are regressed against foreign interest rates, the U.S. is the
dominant influence in each of the four East Asian NICs, though the Japanese interest rate is also
statistically significant in Korea and Singapore. In Australia and New Zealand, only the British
interest rate is important. (The Japanese interest rate actually appears with the wrong sign, as
does the U.S. interest rate in the case of New Zealand.) When the regressions are run on first
differences (rather than levels), as they probably should be, the significance levels fall sharply.
In the case of Singapore, the U.S. interest rate is still the dominant influence, but the results for
the others are less clear.
We can add an interactive time trend to see if the foreign influences change over the
sample period. The United Kingdom is tosing influence in Hong Kong, where the U.S. gains
at its expense, and Singapore, where Japan is the one to gain at the U.K. 's expense. More
surprisingly, Japan appears to be losing influence in Taiwan, at the expense of Germany, and
in Korea and Australia, at the expense of the U.K. Again, when these tests are run on first
differences, significance levels disappear. During most of the sample period, financial markets
27Thefull sample runs from March 1973 to December i990, but data availabitity restricts the sample for many
countries. One country baa less than tan years of data availatle Taiwan, which runs only from May t983 to April
1989. Details are available in an Appendix on recjuest. Imese results may replace Table 6 (which ie taken from
Franks], 1991e) in the final version of the paper.)
20in most of these countries were insufficiently liberalized to respond to foreign interest rates,
regardless of nationality.
These tests leave some important questions unanswered. First, what would such tests
show for the last three years? Economic relationships have been changing rapidly in
international financial markets. Korea and Taiwan, for example, have begun to liberalize and
internationalize only very recently. Second, are the barriers that remain between a given country
and the major world financial centers due to currency factors or country factors? Most of the
Asian countries experience frequent changes in their exchange rates against the yen and the
dollar. Financial markets in a country like Singapore could be very open and yet observed
interest rates could differ from those in Tokyo or New York because of premiums meant to
compensate investors for the possibility of changes in the exchange rate. The question of
whether the yen is playing an increasing role in the exchange rate policies of East Asian
countries is an important one to address, but it should be kept distinct from the question whether
financial links to Tokyo (irrespective of currency) are strengthening.
Table 7 analyzes the determination of interest rates in five Pacific countries with
monthly data for l9S8-91, a time period more recent than that in Table 6, There is more
evidence of an important role on the part of Tokyo than there was in the earlier period. For
Singapore, where the influence of Tokyo in Table 6 was less than New York but rising over
time, estimates in the first row, based simply on interest rates, suggest that the Japanese
financial center has now surpassed its American rival. For Taiwan, Tokyo dominates so
strongly that New York doesn't even seem to matter. For Hong Kong and Australia, on the
other hand, New York dominates. For Korea, the two major financial centers appear to be
21equally strong.
As noted above, a country could have close financial ties with a foreign country and yet
if exchange rate changes are important, the simple regression agaiost the foreign interest rate
would be inappropriately designed to show this relationship. We can take out currency factors
by using the forward exchange market. We simply express the foreign interest rates so as to
be "covered5 or hedged against exchange risk. Doing so in Table 7 changes the results for
Australia and Singapore toward a Tokyo effect that is smaller than the New York effect.2t
(Usable forward rate data are not available for the other countries.)
For four of these countries, there exists another way of correcting for possible exchange
rate changes: direct data on forecasts of market participants collected in a monthly survey by the
Currency Forecaster's Digest of White Plains, N.Y." One advantage of using the survey
responses tn measure expected exchange rate changes is that the data allow us to test explicitly
whether there exists an exchange risk premium that creates art international differential in interest
rates even in the absence of barriers to intemational capital flows. Such a differential would be
compensation to risk-averse investors for holding assets that they view as risky.5° An
For the case of Australia, the coefficient on the covered foreign interest rate is close enough to 1 to constitute
statistical support of the hypothesis that 'covered interest parity' holds.Thatis, capital controls and other barciera
to the movement of capital between SydneyandNew York are close to zero. ('lie Durbin-wataon statistics
improve substantially when the forward rates are included, confirming that the equation that uses covered interest
rates is a more appropriate specification.)
The Currency Forecasters' Direst data is proprietary, and was obtained by suhacription by the Institute for
Interaatinnal Economics,
a The forward rate data allow us to eliminate factors associated with thecurrency in which countries' assets
are denominated, but they do not sllnw us to distinguish between two currency factore the exchange risk premium
and expectations of depreciation. Fur the case of Australia, for example, the support for covered interest parity
suggests that barriers to the movement of capital between Sydney sad New York are low, and so differences in
interest rates are due to currency factors. But when the Australian interest rate is observed to exceed the U.S.
interest rate, is this because the Australian dollar is confidently expected to depreciate, or is it because investors
have no idea what the exchange rate will do aid demand so be compensated for this risk? The survey data may be
22advantage of the Currency Forecasters' Digest data in particular is that they are available even
for countries like Taiwan and Korea where financial markets are less developed. A potential
disadvantage is the possibility that survey data measure the expectations of marker participants
imperfectly.
For Singapore, the survey data corroborate the finding from the forward rate data that,
once expected depreciation is eliminated as a factor, the New York effect dominates the Tokyo
effect. For Korea, the survey data also show that the Tokyo effect becomes smaller than the
New York effect. For Australia and Taiwan, both effects largely disappear.
The Role of the Yen in AsiaxLExdhnngeE.afeYolicies
The finding that eliminating exchange rate expectations from the calculation leaves Tokyo
with relatively little effect on local interest rates in most of these countries does not mean that
the Japanese influence is not strong. It is likely, rather, that much of the influence in the Pacific
comes precisely through the role of the yen. If Pacific countries assign high weight to the yen
in setting their exchange rate policies, then their interest rates will be heavily influenced by
Japanese interest rates.
No Asian or Pacific countries have ever pegged their currencies to the yen in the post-
war period. But neither are there any Pacific countries that the International Monetary Fund
classifies as still pegging to the U.S. dollar. (As already mentioned, Hong Kong pegs to the
dollar; but the Colony is not an official member of the IMF.) Malaysia and Thailand, and a
number of Pacific island countries, officially peg to a basket of major currencies and are thought
able to distinguish between thesetwohypotheses, whereas the forward rate data cansot.
23to give weight to both the dollar and yen, but the weights are not officially announced.
It is interesting to estimate econometrically the weights given to the dollar, yen, and other
major currencies in exchange rate policies of Asian/Pacific countries, especia1l those who
follow a basket peg but do not officially announce the weights. This involves regressing changes
in the value of the currency in question against changes in the value of the yen, dollar, etc.
There is a methodological question of what numeraire should be used to measure the
value of the currencies. A simple solution is to use the SDR as numeraire. This approach
suffers from the drawback that the SDR is itself a basket of five major currencies including the
dollar and yen. An alternative approach that is a little neater theoretically is to use purchasing
power over local goods (the inverse of the local price level) as the numeraire. Whatever the
numeraire, under the null hypothesis that a particular currency is pegged to the dollar or yen,
or to a weighted basket, the regression results should show this clearly, featuring even a high
R2. We focus here on the purchasing power measure.
Regressions of changes in the real value of the Hong Kong dollar against changes in the
value of the five major currencies show highly significant coefficients on the U.S. dollar during
the periods 1974-80 and 1984-90 [not reported here]. The weight on the dollar is statistically
indistinguishable from 1 during most of the latter 7-year period, and the R2 reaches .96 during
the last four years.Occasional sub-periods show apparently significant weights on other
currencies (the yen during 1979-81, the franc during 1983-85, and the mark during 1986-88).
Overall, however, the numbers bear out Hong Kong's peg to the dollar.
Regressions of changes in the real value of the Malaysian ringgit against the five major
currencies, reported in Table Ba, give a large significant weight to the dollar. Some sub-periods
24show a significant weight on the mark, and during 1986-88 even the pound is significant. But
the yen is not significant during any three-year sub-period. The constant term is negative (and
statistically significant), indicating a trend depreciation, and the R5 is fairly low, indicating that
thebasket"peg"wasloose (even if one allows for a crawling peg).5'
The Singapore dollar shows significant weights (of about .2 each) on the U.S. dollar and
mark during the period 1974-77. The regression for 1977-79 shows a rough basket peg
(R2 =.83) with significant weights of .09 on the yen, .47 on the dollar, .25onthe mark, and
.09 on the pound. The weight on the dollar diminishes thereafter, and the weight on the yen
increases. By 1983-85, the yen weight (at a significant .20) has temporarily passed the dollar
weight (at a significant .19). From 1986 to 1990 only the dollar is significant.
The results for the real value of the Thai baht, reported in Table 8b, show a very close
peg to the dollar from 1974 to 1980, whereupon the dollar weight falls somewhat. Beginning
in 1986, a pattern emerges of significant weights on the yen and pound, in addition to the dollar.
During the period 1988-90, the haM exhibits a close-to-perfect peg (P2 =.99)to a basket with
estimated weights of .82 on the dollar, .13 on the yen, .06 on the mark, and .02 on the pound.
Korea also claimed to have a sort of basket peg in the 1980s, but with large adjustments.
Regressions of the change in the real value of the won show a statistically significant weight on
the value of the dollar during the period April 1980 to March 1986, with art estimated coefficient
of .4 to .5. (The Canadian dollar, which was reputed to be included in the Korean basket, also
shows up with a significant coefficient of .2 during part of the period.) There is a significant
constant term (the "alpha") during this period: the value of the won declined during the early
" This turns out to be tn'e of almost all currencies worldwide that purport to be on a basket peg (exclodtn
a peg to the SDR).1980s, whether measured by inflation or depreciation, relative to foreign currencies. The dollar,
like the other major currencies, is insignificant during the period April 1985 to March 1987.
Its influence re-emerges from April 1986 to March 1988. But then during the final two-year
sub-periOd, April 1988 to March 1990, the yen (with a highly significant coefficient estimated
at .18) suddenly eclipses the dollar (with an insignificant coefficient of .l1).32
To summarize, there is some evidence of increased yen influence in the case of the
Singapore dollar in the early 1980s and the Thai baht in the late l980s. The only place where
the yen appears to have become as important as the dollar is Korea in the period since 1988.
The Role of the Yen In Reserves anti Invoicing
There is other evidence that the yen is playing an increasing role in the region. As Tahie
9 shows, Asian central banks in the course of the 1980s increased their holdings of yen from
13.9 per cent of their foreign exchange reserve portfolios to 17.1 per cent.53 Foreign exchange
market trading in the regional financial centers of Singapore and Hong Kong, though still
overwhelmingly conducted in dollars, now shows a much higher proportion of trading in yen
than is the case in Europe.
The yen is also being used more widely to invoice lending and trade in Asia. The
countries that incurred large international debts in the 1970s and early 19 SOs subsequently shifted
The results for the won are reported in Frankel (1992), [With value measured in terms or purchasing power.
Value is measured also in terms of the 501k in a related paper to be pubtished by the Hoover Institution, but the
regreaaiona are against the dollar and yen alone.J 'Thedeutsche mark and Swiss franc are the two currencies that suffered the largest loss in share in the regioa
Tavias and Oseki (1992, p.35).
26the composition away from dollar-denominated debt and toward yen-denominated debt. Table
9 shows that the yen share among five major Asian debtors nearly doubled between 1980 and
1988, entirely at the expense of the dollar. Table 10 shows that the share of trade denominated
in yen is greater in Southeast Asia than in other regions, and that was an especially rapid
increase from 1983 to 1990 in the share of Southeast Asian imports denominated in yenY
PART ifi: CONCLUSIONS
We may draw eight conclusions.
(1) The 1e4oftrade in East Asia, like trade within the European Community and within the
Western Hemisphere, is biased toward intraregional trade, to a greater extent than can be
explained naturally by distance. By way of contrast to Krugman's natura1 trade blocs, one
might call these three regions "super-natural" blocs. (2) There is no evidence of a special Japan
effect within Asia. (3) Although growth in Japan, the four NICs, and other East Asian
countries, is rapidly increasing their weight in world output and trade, the statistics do not bear
out a jgg toward intra-regional bias of trade and direct investment flows. (5)Theintra-
regional trade bias did increase in Europe in the 1980s, in the Western Hemisphere in the late
1980; and in the grouping that includes the U.S. and Canada together with the Asian/Pacific
countries, i.e., APEC. (6) The APEC trade grouping appears to be the world's strongest,
whether judged by rate of change of intra-group bias or (as of 1990) by level of bias. Far from
'Taviasand Ozeki (1991, 92) give further statistics and discussion.
27being shut outof a strongAsian bloc centered on Japan, the United States and Canada are in the
enviable position of belonging to bQth of the world's two strongest groupings.
(7) There is more evidence of rising Japanese influence in the East Asia's financial
markets than is the case for trade. Tokyo appears to have recently acquired a dominant
influence over interest rates in Singapore and Taiwan. lt also has important and increasing
effectson interestrates elsewhere in the Pacific, though overall its influence is as yet no greater
than that of New York. (8) SomeofJapan's financial influence takes place through a growing
role for the yen, at the expense of the dollar. There has been a gradual increase in the yen's
relative importance in invoicing of trade and finance in the region, and in some countries'
exchange rate policies.
This still leaves a question raised at the beginning of this essay. Are the financial and
monetary trends the outcome of deliberate policy measures on the part of Japan? Gradually-
increasing use of the yen intemationally is primarily the outcome of private decisions by
importers, exporters, borrowers and lenders. It is difficult to see signs of deliberate policy
actions taken by the Japanese govemment to increase its financial and monetary influence in
Asia. To the contrary, at least until recently, the Japanese government has resisted any tendency
for the yen to become an international currency in competition with the dollar.
It has been the U.S. government, in the Yen/Dollar Agreement of 1984 and in subsequent
negotiations, that has been pushing Japan to internationalize the yen, to promote its worldwide
use in trade, finance, and central bank policies.36 It has also been the U.S. government that
has been pushing Korea and other East Asian NICs to open up their financial markets, thereby
3'Frankel (1984).
28allowing Japanese capital and Japanese financial institutions to enter these countries. It has again
been the U.S. government that has been pushing Korea and Taiwan to move away from policies
to stabilize the value of their currencies against the dollar.3' The increasing role of the yen in
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Intra— 1980 .33 .32 .51
regional
trade / 1986 .32 .35 .57
total
trade 1989 .37 .36 .59
(2)
Intra-
regional 1980 2.2 1.9 1.3
bias,
holding






holding 1980 .70 .53 .23
constant
for GNP, 1985 .40 .34 .44
population,
distance, etc. 1990 .60 .97 .46
Sources:
{1)Schott (1991) and Direction of Trade, International Monetary
Fund, as computed in Frankel (1991c).
(2) computed as the ratio of (1) to shares of world trade, as
described in text.
(3) Gravity regressions, reported in Tables 2,3, and 4,
respectively. They include also significant coefficients on the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5: Japan's Foreign Direct Investment





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total 6.50007,310 160,0 5,90350,211 320.063,229310,000 135.0














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Japanese and U.S. Interest Rate Effects In Five Pacific Countries
Regressions of local interest rate againsti
1) Japanese and U.S. interest rates
2) Japanese and U.S. interest rates adjusted for expectations
of exchange rate changes as reflected in Currency Forecasters' Digest

























































































*Statisticallydifferent from zero at 90 % significance level.
***Statisticallydifferent froa zero at99 % significance level.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shareof the Ten inflcht—Denceiinationand Official Raeene Holdinga
In per cent
Ten ehare in











1980 20.0 16.6 19.0 22.0 25.5 19.5 13.9 4.4
1901 19.3 14.1 15.9 20.6 23.2 17.8 15.5 4.2
1982 21.0 12.3 13.3 19.2 24.0 17.2 17.6 4.7
1983 23.3 12.5 14.2 20.0 27.3 18.5 15.5 5.0
1984 25.0 12.8 21.2 20.0 29.2 20.3 16.3 5.8
1985 31.7 16.7 26.4 24.9 36.1 25.8 26.9 8.0
1906 33.9 22.0 30.4 25.5 39.9 29.3 22.9 7.9
1987 39.4 27.2 35.7 35.2 43.1 36.0 30.0 7.5
1988 39.3 29.5 37.1 40.5 43.5 37.9 26.7 7.7
1989 35.2 26.6 36.6 32.6 40.9 35.7 17.5 7.9
1990 17.1 9.1
tsalected Asian countries (nDt including Japan).
Source: Tavlaa andOzeki(1992, p.39).Table 10
Shareof the Tenin Deoination of Foreign Trade
inpercent
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance, Annual Recort,
asreported in Tavtas andozeki(1992, p.33).
Denomination of exports Deooaination of imports
Southeast AsiaAll regions Southeast Asia[All_regions
1983 48.0 40.4 2.0 3.0
1986 37.5 38.5 9.2 9.7
1987 35.3 34.7 13.9 11.5
1988 41.2 34.3 17.5 13.3
1959 43.5 34.7 19.5 14-1
1990 48.9 37.5 19.4 14-4